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 ch a pter 2 
 Nozick’s defense of closure 
 Peter  Baumann 
 Robert Nozick’s conception of knowledge has triggered a lot of criticism 
over the last three decades. According to one kind of objection, Nozick’s 
conditions of knowledge are either not necessary or not suﬃ  cient or nei-
ther necessary nor suﬃ  cient for knowledge. It is not clear how serious 
this kind of objection is: Nozick did not intend his proposal to constitute 
a ﬁ nal reductive deﬁ nition of  knowledge in terms of individually neces-
sary and jointly suﬃ  cient conditions; whether Nozick’s account can deal 
with such objections depends on the interpretation of certain aspects of 
the account as well as on the further development of the account. For all 
or almost all objections of this kind (see, e.g., Kripke 2011), there have 
been interesting and perhaps even promising defenses of Nozick’s theory 
(see, e.g., Adams and Clarke  2005 ). Another kind (see, e.g., Kripke 2011), 
of objection, however, is more serious. No matter what the exact details 
of the theory and no matter how one further develops it, it will always 
be incompatible with a very plausible and important epistemic principle, 
namely the principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment 
(the “principle of closure ”). Nozick himself openly stated that his account 
of knowledge is incompatible with closure (see Nozick  1981 , 206–11 1 ) – 
and stuck with the theory, dropping closure. Most philosophers went the 
other way and stuck with closure, giving up on any theory like Nozick’s 
which is incompatible with closure. If anything is “the killer objection” to 
Nozick’s account, then it is based on his denial of closure. 2 
 In this chapter I will argue ﬁ rst (section  ii ) that at least in many 
cases Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. Second 
( section  iii ), and much more importantly, Nozick does not – despite ﬁ rst 
(and second) appearances and despite his own words – deny closure. On 
  1  References by page number only are to Nozick  1981 . 
 2  Alternative modal accounts of knowledge, like the safety account (see Sosa  1999 ; Williamson 
 2000 ), face similar problems with closure (see Kvanvig  2004 , 209; Murphy  2005 ; Sosa  1999 , 149); 
it is remarkable that this is generally not seen as a big problem for safety accounts. 
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the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle 
of closure. 3 h is principle does remarkably well, though it is not with-
out problems. It is surprising how rarely Nozick’s principle of closure has 
been discussed. He should be seen not so much as a denier of closure 
than as someone who’s proposing an alternative, more complex principle 
of closure. Let us start with some remarks on Nozick’s account of know-
ledge and on the principle of closure. 
 i   k now l edge a nd closur e 
 Nozick holds that a true belief constitutes knowledge just in case it stands 
in a certain modal relation to the fact that makes it true. 4 Knowledge, 
according to Nozick , is true belief which “tracks” the truth across a range 
of possible circumstances (or worlds); in other words, knowledge is true 
belief which is “sensitive” to the truth across a range of possible worlds . 5 
Here is a ﬁ rst list of conditions which spells out this idea (with “□→” for 
the subjunctive conditional ):
 Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p :  S knows that  p iﬀ  
 (1)  p 
 (2)  S believes that  p 
 (3)  Not- p □ →  S does not believe that  p 
 (4)  p □ →  S believes that  p 
 (See Nozick  1981 , 172–78; for an earlier account along very similar lines 
see Dretske  1971 . See also Goldman  1976 and Carrier  1971 .) 
 Nozick adds that the subjunctive conditions need to be taken to hold 
with respect not to all possible worlds but only to close ones (see 173–
74); he says very little, if anything, about what constitutes closeness or 
remoteness of possible worlds. Apart from that, Nozick argues, using his 
well-known grandmother case , 6 that we have to include a reference to 
 3  Can it still count as a principle of closure? h ere is not one single agreed-upon formulation of a 
unique closure principle but rather diﬀ erent though similar formulations of the same basic idea. 
Nozick’s principle is similar enough to these formulations to deserve the title “closure principle.” 
Furthermore, if what makes a principle a principle of closure is that it can explain how we can 
acquire new knowledge by inference from old knowledge, then Nozick’s principle also has to 
count as a closure principle. 
 4  Talk about “facts” or “truth-makers” should not be interpreted here as having any substantial 
metaphysical implications. 
 5  h e terms “tracking” and “sensitivity” are not always used the same way in the literature; here I 
am using them as synonyms referring to the conjunction of Nozick’s third and fourth condition. 
 6  “A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but if he were sick or dead, 
others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this does not mean she doesn’t know he 
is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees him. Clearly, we must restate our conditions to take 
explicitly account of the ways and methods of arriving at belief” (179). 
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methods of belief acquisition used by the subject (see 179–85). How to 
individuate methods is a diﬃ  cult and well-known problem (see below). 
h ere is also a bit of a debate about how exactly to include a reference to 
methods in condition (3), the  variation condition , and in condition (4), 
the  adherence condition (see Luper-Foy  1984 , 28–29; Williamson  2000 , 
153–56; Becker  2009 , 20; Alfano  2009 , 274–75): should reference to the 
method used appear in both the antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional or only in one of those? Not too much depends on this 
question here and we can include it in both, following Nozick (mak-
ing adjustments and modiﬁ cations when necessary and as we go along). 
h is gives us the following explanation of the concept of knowledge , 
according to Nozick 7 : 
 (Nozick-Knowledge)  Necessarily, for all subjects  S , all methods  M , and for all 
propositions  p :  S knows via  M that  p iﬀ  
 (1)  p 
 (2)  S believes via M that  p 
 (3)  (Not- p and  S uses  M to settle whether  p ) □→  S does 
not believe on the basis of using  M that  p 
 (4)  ( p and  S uses  M to settle whether  p ) □→  S believes 
on the basis of using  M that  p (see 172–79). 
 So much for the concept of knowledge as Nozick explains it. What about 
closure ? 
 Here is a ﬁ rst, very rough, version of a closure principle:
 Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p and  q : if  S knows that  p , 
and if  S knows that  p entails  q , then  S knows that  q . 
 However, this won’t do.  S might simply not put “two and two together”: 
 S might know the ﬁ rst proposition and also know that it entails a second 
proposition but simply not make the relevant inference and thus not come 
even to believe the second proposition. Apart from that, we tend to ﬁ nd 
closure principles plausible because they explain how we can have inferen-
tial knowledge. h is gives us the following version of a closure principle :
 Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p and  q : if  S knows that  p , 
and if  S competently infers  q from  p , then  S knows that  q . 
 But what if  S knows the ﬁ rst proposition and makes the relevant infer-
ence but just cannot bring himself to believe the second proposition, for 
 7  We can probably leave the problem aside here how (3) applies to necessary propositions (see 186–
87). We can also leave aside complications arising from the use of a plurality of methods (see 
180–85). I will call whatever meets (Nozick-Knowledge) “Nozick-knowledge.” 
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instance, because it strikes him as wildly implausible? (See Harman  1986 , 
11–12.) Let us strengthen the antecedent further: 
 (Closure)  Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p and  q : if  S 
knows that  p , and if  S competently infers  q from  p , and if  S thereby 
comes to believe that  q , then  S knows that  q (see, e.g., Williamson 
 2000 , 117). 
 h is is probably not the last word. h e subject might lose knowledge of 
the ﬁ rst proposition before she comes to believe the second proposition 
(see, e.g., Hawthorne  2004 , 29, 33). Should we therefore strengthen the 
antecedent further and add the condition that the subject retains her 
knowledge of the ﬁ rst proposition until she comes to believe the second 
proposition? Or what if the subject learns of some defeater for the second 
proposition while making the inference? (See Kvanvig  2006 , 261–62.) 
Should we add still another condition that this is not so (or at least: that 
this is not so in the case of undefeated defeaters )? David and Warﬁ eld 
( 2008 , sections  ii – iii ) argue for further modiﬁ cations, but we do not need 
to go into the potentially endless business of adding further conditions 
to the antecedent. (Closure) is suﬃ  cient here as a formulation of a com-
monly accepted principle of closure . What now is the relation between 
(Nozick-Knowledge) and (Closure)? 
 i i   noz ick e a n v iol at ions of (closur e)? 
 I am sitting on a chair right now and I believe that I am sitting on a chair 
right now. Were I lying on a sofa, walking on my hands, or engaged in one 
of the many realistic alternative ways of not sitting on a chair now, then I 
wouldn’t believe (via the usual methods) that I’m sitting on a chair right 
now. Were I sitting on a chair now but something else was diﬀ erent (but not 
too wildly diﬀ erent), then I would still believe that I am sitting on a chair 
right now (again, via my usual methods for ﬁ nding such things out). In other 
words, my belief that I am sitting on a chair right now meets Nozick’s con-
ditions for knowledge. According to Nozick , I know that I am sitting on a 
chair right now. Furthermore, I might competently infer from this and thus 
come to believe that I am not currently climbing the wall instead of sitting 
on a chair. h is belief, too, constitutes knowledge: were I currently climbing 
the wall, I wouldn’t believe I’m not doing that, and were I abstaining from 
wall-climbing in diﬀ erent ways I would keep believing that I’m abstinent. In 
other words, I know that I am not currently climbing the wall. h is accords 
with what (Closure ) demands; this is a case where (Nozick-Knowledge) and 
(Closure) are unproblematically compatible with each other. 
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 h ings get much trickier in other cases. I believe that I am currently 
sitting on a chair and I competently infer from this and come to believe 
that I am not merely hallucinating that I am currently sitting on a chair. 
However, were I merely hallucinating I would typically still believe I’m 
not. I don’t know according to (Nozick-Knowledge) but I do know 
according to (Closure) – given plausible assumptions – that I’m not merely 
hallucinating that I am currently sitting on a chair. Nozick-Knowledge is 
not closed. And that, according to many, is a huge problem for Nozick’s 
account of knowledge: shouldn’t closure be preserved? 
 Nozick himself states that his tracking account violates closure (see 
206–11). He accepts closure under known equivalence (see 229, 690n. 
60), under known existential generalization (see 234; but cf. Fumerton 
 1987 , 172, and Garrett  1999 for counterexamples), under known disjunc-
tion introduction (230) and conjunction introduction (236), but he denies 
closure under known universal instantiation or conjunction elimination 
(227–29). 
 According to Nozick , I can, for instance, know that I am currently 
seated and not a brain in the vat on a shelf which falsely believes itself to 
be currently located on a chair; however, I cannot know that I am not a 
brain in the vat on a shelf thinking of itself as being located on a chair. 
Hence, I cannot come to know the latter by competent inference from 
the former. (Closure) is violated. Similar things hold for other kinds of 
inferences which have played an important role in recent discussions on 
skepticism. I truly believe that I have hands, and I can competently infer 
from that and thus come to believe that I am not being deceived by some 
Cartesian demon into falsely believing that I have hands. Nozick would 
grant me knowledge of the former but not knowledge of the latter; hence, 
closure fails in this case. 
 It is not so clear whether we should lament the failure of closure in such 
cases. h e alternatives don’t look much better: either suspiciously (but 
cf. Klein  1981 ) easy denials of skepticism or rampant skepticism deny-
ing that we even know that we have hands. 8 Much more threatening to 
(Nozick-Knowledge) are cases where no denials of skeptical scenarios are 
 8  But can’t I know that I’m not merely dreaming that I’m currently seated (given that I am 
currently seated) simply because the method I’m using in non-sceptical circumstances in 
order to ﬁ gure out whether I’m seated is not applicable at all under sceptical circumstances 
(see Lipson  1987 , 330–31, and Williams  1996 , 336–46)? Brains in the vat don’t use their 
senses because they don’t have any senses. It is not at all clear how this relates to Nozick’s 
account, given that Nozick assumes that the method can be used no matter whether  p 
or  not-p is the case. Would it still be the same account if we gave up the idea that the vari-
ation condition can always be applied (see also 214–17)? h ese questions also relate to the 
issue where in the counterfactual conditionals the method should be mentioned (see above). 
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involved. Take, for instance, Kripke’s example (see Kripke 2011, 186–87 
and, in addition, 178–79 and 192, 197, as well as Goldman’s early dachs-
hund example in Goldman 1976, 779–83 and in Goldman 1983, 84–85, 
as well as, building on it, Dretske’s VW-Saab example in Dretske 1975, 
801):  S is in fake-barn country where only red barns are exempted from 
being faked; under such circumstances it seems that  S might know she 
is facing a red barn, come to believe on the basis of inference that she is 
facing a barn but not come to know that there is a barn because the lat-
ter belief does not meet (Nozick-Knowledge-3). 
 What can the Nozickean do about such cases? One option is to bite 
the bullet and simply deny (Closure) or related principles (see, e.g., 
Becker  2007 , ch. 6). But there are less controversial and quite interest-
ing alternatives. One can deny that there is a failure of closure in the red 
barn case. As soon as one takes the relativity to methods seriously, so this 
idea goes, one can see that the subject knows that there is a barn. h e 
subject came to believe that there is a barn via the “red barn method” 
of inferring it from the proposition that there is a red barn. Had there 
not been a barn but a non-red fake barn, then the subject would not 
have come to believe that there is a barn on the basis of the red barn 
method ; the subject would have used a diﬀ erent method. 9 Since there 
are also no problems with the adherence condition, we can conclude 
that  (Nozick-Knowledge), applied in the right way, does indeed give the 
right result in the red barn case (see Adams and Clarke 2005, 214–16; see 
also Roush 2005, 102 as well as 157–59 on Goldman’s dachshund case; 
Goldman himself favours a similar strategy for this kind of problem – 
see Goldman 1976, 779–80; for the application of this kind of strategy to 
Moorean anti-sceptical arguments see Black 2002). 10 
  9  h e question whether the relativization to methods should appear in the consequent or in the 
antecedent (or in both) of the subjunctive conditional comes up again here. If it appears in the 
antecedent and we are checking for the variation condition, then we are dealing with circum-
stances (the subject facing a non-red barn) in which the subject can only use the relevant method 
(the red barn method) if it is basically mistaken (sees the wrong color) or confused (chooses a 
clearly inappropriate method). If we can take (Nozick-Knowledge) in the sense that the use of 
the method does not allow for such basic mistakes or confusions, then we can conclude that at 
least in some cases, like the one here, the method should only be mentioned in the consequent. 
All the cases above also suggest that whether it should appear in the consequent or in the ante-
cedent or in both might vary from case to case. 
  10  h ere are more examples like that. Williamson, for instance, presents the case of someone who 
knows that Jack is 6 ft 9 in tall and therefore also knows that Jack is taller than 6 ft though the 
latter belief is not sensitive (see Williamson  2000 , 159–60, for this kind of example). Becker 
 2009 , 27–30, uses the above kind of strategy in reply (see also Roush  2005 , 71–72). Hawthorne 
 2004 , 45, presents the case of someone who knows that they have eaten less than a pound of sal-
mon and thus also know that they have eaten less than 14 pounds of salmon (even if eating 14 
pounds would have produced the illusion that they have eaten less than one pound). Hilpinen 
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 One major problem with this kind of strategy is that it has proved notori-
ously diﬃ  cult to identify the method used by the subject in a systematic, 
principled, and non-arbitrary way; the so-called generality problem (see 
Feldman  1985 ; Bach  1985 ) probably has no solution. Defenders of Nozick 
might feel free to characterize the method in such a way that the subject 
comes out knowing, while critics of Nozick might do it in such a way that 
the subject comes out not knowing (see on this also Williams  2002 , 149–
51). Lacking an argument for one characterization over all alternatives, this 
strategy to save Nozick from the red barn objection seems as plausible or 
implausible as the objection itself. We have reached an impasse here. 
 Another strategy to reply to red barn cases and also to other kinds of 
cases exploits a further gap in Nozick’s theory: the lack of a closeness 
metric for possible worlds . h ere have been attempts (see Lewis  1979 ) to 
provide one, but it is not clear whether they can be successful (see Barker 
 1987 , 287; Grobler  2001 , 293; and Baumann  2009 ), and Nozick himself 
does not oﬀ er one. So, one might try to propose a closeness metric which 
would save Nozick from a given counterexample. However, not only is it 
not clear how to use this in a plausible way to save Nozick from red barn 
cases and other cases: is a world in which the subject looks at a non-red 
fake barn really too remote and more remote than a world in which the 
subject looks at some non-fake barn? One might also suspect that there 
are at least some cases where the more plausible closeness-rankings allow 
for an objection against Nozick rather than for his defense. Alternatively, 
we do face at least the same kind of unsatisfying indeterminacy as in the 
case of diﬀ erent characterizations of the method used. 11 
 What then about the idea proposed by Roush ( 2005 , 41–51), namely 
to turn the variation  and adherence conditions, conditions (3) and (4), 
respectively, in (Nozick-Knowledge), into suﬃ  cient but not necessary 
conditions and to add a further suﬃ  cient but not necessary condition 
according to which one can come to know a proposition on the basis of 
a competent inference? h is could still be seen as an account which is 
broadly Nozickean in spirit and at the same time can deal with red barn 
cases and other cases (see Roush  2005 , 57–74, 93–113). But this wouldn’t 
be Nozick’s pure tracking account . Since we’re dealing with the prospects 
 1988 , 161–63, presents the case of someone who comes to know, by consulting a thermometer 
which is reliable for the range between 0°C and 100°C but not beyond, that the temperature is 
37° and thus also that the temperature is not below –40°; the latter belief, however, would violate 
Nozick’s variation condition. 
  11  It does not help the Nozickian to point out that in the red barn case the subject can non-inferen-
tially come to know that there is a barn. What is at issue here is whether the subject can come to 
know this on the basis of an inference. It seems very plausible to say that this should be possible; 
hence Nozickian accounts have a problem here. 
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of such an account in the face of (apparent or real) failures of closure , we 
should leave these kinds of ideas aside here. 
 Finally, the Nozickean could argue that at least in some cases closure 
holds because we do know the conclusion of our competent inference 
after all. Take the dreaming argument . Assume that I am seated right 
now and suppose that I know this. It seems that I cannot come to know 
on the basis of this that I am not merely dreaming that I am seated right 
now. h e latter, many would say, is something I simply cannot know. 
But why not? Presumably because the variation  condition is violated: 
were I merely dreaming that I am seated right now, then I would still 
believe that I am not merely dreaming right now that I am currently 
seated. However, some argue that we don’t have beliefs in dreams (see, 
e.g., Sosa  2007 , ch. 1). If that is right, then (Nozick-Knowledge-3) is not 
violated: if I were merely dreaming that I am seated right now, then I 
would not believe that I’m not (because I wouldn’t believe anything in 
the ﬁ rst place). h ere are several problems with this kind of move. First, 
the Nozickean would have to burden his account with some substantial 
piece of philosophy of mind. Second, and more importantly, this won’t 
help against other skeptical scenarios: don’t brains in vats have beliefs? 
Or hallucinators? h ird, the natural interpretation of the variation as 
well as the adherence condition is that the subject would have beliefs 
in the relevant counterfactual circumstances; we were not thinking of 
accepting such “vacuous” meeting of the conditions (see Barker  1987 , 
291–92 for a similar point in the case of knowing that one has beliefs). 
 Related maneuvres are even less promising and even more problematic. 
Take the following idea. I am standing in front of Dack, the dachshund. I 
know that this animal in front of me is a dachshund . I competently infer 
from this that this animal in front of me is a dog. I even know this latter 
proposition: despite the fact that I cannot tell dogs from wolves, my belief 
that this animal in front of me is a dog meets the variation  condition. 
Were I, say, facing a wolf, I might still say “h is animal in front of me is 
a dog” but thereby express a belief diﬀ erent from the belief triggered by 
Dack. h e same demonstrative sentence changes its content (the content 
of the belief expressed) with a change in the reference of the demonstra-
tive “this” or “this F”. So, in a diﬀ erent counterfactual situation like the 
one above I just would not be able to have the same belief. Hence my 
belief that this animal in front of me is a dog is sensitive after all. Similar 
points can be made about indexicals (see for this kind of thought also: 
Gendler and Hawthorne  2005 , 333–34; Manley  2007 , 403–6; Kripke 2011, 
169–71 (especially notes 20, 23), 192 (note 56), and 213–14). 
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 h is kind of move backﬁ res badly. 12 First, we do have a “vacuous” 
conformity with the variation condition here. Much more important is 
a second worry. Compare the demonstrative belief that this animal in 
front of me is a dog with the non-demonstrative belief that I am currently 
looking at a dog. h e latter belief violates the variation condition while 
the former doesn’t. So, according to Nozick I would not know that I am 
currently looking at a dog, but I would know that this animal in front 
of me is a dog. 13 h is sounds like an abominable conjunction : it is very 
implausible that one could not know the one while knowing the other. (It 
is also implausible that I can come to know that this animal is a dog by 
inference from  h is animal is a dachshund while I cannot come to know 
that there is a dog in front of me by inference from  h ere is a dachshund in 
front of me .) So, the last attempt to save Nozick from closure failure does 
not help at all and in addition raises general doubts about how Nozick’s 
account would deal with indexical or demonstrative beliefs. 14 
 Where does all this leave us? Fiddling around with the characteriza-
tion of the method used or with the closeness metric will at best lead 
to a situation where neither Nozick nor the critic has an argumentative 
advantage. Other strategies look rather dim for the original Nozickean 
account. Should we then simply accept that Nozick denies (Closure) as 
well as related principles? 
 i i i   noz ick-closur e 
 No, this is not the end of the story. h ere are good reasons to think that 
(Closure) is not even close to a satisfying principle of closure . We should 
therefore wait with our judgment about whether (Nozick-Knowledge) 
violates closure until we have found a more adequate principle of closure. 
  12  It deserves mentioning that it does not help to try to block it by reformulating (Nozick-
Knowledge) in terms of Kaplanian belief “character” rather than Kaplanian belief “content” (see 
Kaplan  1989 , 500–7). Character underdetermines content. 
  13  Similar problems arise for my belief that Dax is a dog if we adopt Kripkean ideas about essential 
properties and argue that dachshunds are essentially dogs: Dax just couldn’t be a wolf. Suppose 
I thus know that Dax is a dog and also know that there is Dax in front of me. I would still not 
know, so it seems, that there is a dog in front of me. See Hughes  1996 for a series of cases along 
such lines as well as for the argument that I could, for Kripkean reasons, not be a brain in a vat, 
so that my belief that I’m not a brain in a vat would vacuously meet the variation condition and I 
would know that I am not a brain in the vat; see Hughes  1996 , 313; see also Goldman  1987 , 187. 
  14  Consider Russell’s old clock example (see Russell  1948 , 98). I look at a stopped clock which 
happens to indicate the current time and I come to truly believe that it is 12.15 now. According 
to Nozick, I would know this: had I looked at the clock ﬁ ve minutes later, I would not have 
expressed the same belief by “It is 12.15 now,” given the changed reference of “now” (and, obvi-
ously, had the clock indicated a diﬀ erent time, I would not have acquired a 12.15-belief). 
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I will ﬁ rst explain why (Closure) is not satisfying and propose a modiﬁ -
cation. Second, I will argue that one can ﬁ nd a more satisfying principle 
in Nozick’s text (contra Nozick himself). h ird, I will discuss how this 
principle deals with relevant problem cases. 
 Let us start with a case. I wonder what the temperature is and check my 
reliable thermometer, which indicates that it’s 66 degrees Fahrenheit. h is 
is true and I come to know, relying on the thermometer, that it’s 66 degrees 
Fahrenheit. I also come to know that the thermometer indicates that it’s 
66 degrees Fahrenheit. I competently infer from this and thus come to 
believe that the thermometer is indicating the temperature correctly in this 
instance. However, it seems clear that I cannot thus come to know that the 
thermometer is indicating the temperature correctly in this instance. I can 
even repeat this exercise and conclude that the thermometer is reliable. 
However, it seems clear, too, that I cannot thus come to know that the 
thermometer is reliable. I cannot “bootstrap” myself into knowledge in 
this way: there is no such “easy knowledge ” (see Cohen  2002 or Sosa  2009 , 
chs. 4, 5, 9, 10). But what then? If I competently made the inference to the 
conclusion, then it would follow that I don’t know the premises. But that 
seems also very implausible. Should we then deny closure ? 15 
 No, but perhaps we should deny (Closure) and replace it by a diﬀ erent 
principle? What is creating the problem here is that I can only be said to 
come to know the temperature if it is OK for me to rely on the therm-
ometer. As long as I don’t have a positive reason to think that there might 
be something wrong with the thermometer, I may rely on it and am able 
to get to know what the temperature is, even if I don’t have any ante-
cedent knowledge that the thermometer is reliable; if it was not OK for 
me to rely on the thermometer, then I could also not be said to know the 
temperature. (One might protest that I cannot know anything if I don’t 
know that I have come to my belief in a reliable way; this, however, leads 
directly to skepticism and is not relevant here insofar as we’re looking 
for a plausible non-skeptical way out of our problem.) What I cannot do 
is gain knowledge of a conclusion based on an inference from premises 
which I can be said to know only insofar as I can presuppose and take for 
granted the not-yet-known conclusion. h is is the circularity that stands 
in the way of acquiring knowledge of the conclusion. We can thus refor-
mulate (Closure) in the following way: 
 (Closure*)  Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p and  q : if  S 
knows that  p , and if  S competently infers  q from  p , and if  S thereby 
comes to believe that  q , then  S knows that  q – but not if  q is both 
  15  Our case here involves two premises instead of one; however, this deviation does not matter here. 
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antecedently unknown by  S but taken for granted and presupposed 
by S’s belief and knowledge that  p . 
 h is formulation might not give us the ﬁ nal version of an acceptable 
closure principle, but it is good enough and close enough for our pur-
poses here (see for ideas in this direction: Dretske 1970, 1014; Wright 1985, 
432–38, Wright 2000; Davies 1998; Davies 2000; and more recently Barke 
2002, 164-66; the above principle is obviously inspired by ideas from the 
recent debate on failure of transmission of warrant). 16 
 One advantage of (Closure*) over (Closure) is that the former but not 
the latter can explain in a plausible way how we can know the premises in 
the above case but not the conclusion. It also has an advantage in other 
important problem cases. Consider the following one (see Harman  1973 , 
161; Vogel  1990 , 15–20; Hawthorne  2004 ). Suppose you know that you 
don’t own and will never own 50 million dollars. Suppose you know that 
this entails that you will never win 50 million dollars in a lottery . But it 
seems that you can never come to know that you will never win 50 mil-
lion dollars in a lottery (given that you own a ticket in a fair lottery). h is 
can be generalized to many other “lottery propositions” (see Vogel  1990 , 
16–17). I am talking to a shopkeeper and all the circumstances are normal. 
It is thus hard not to grant me knowledge that I am talking to a shop-
keeper. But do I know what is entailed by that, namely, for instance, that I 
am not talking to a robot programmed to behave like a shopkeeper which 
was coincidentally sent to exactly the shop I frequent? It is not diﬃ  cult at 
all to ﬁ nd lots of pairs of propositions such that one is an ordinary propos-
ition which we take ourselves to know and the other one is a highly prob-
able but unknown “lottery proposition” which can be inferred from it. 
 Again, with (Closure) we face the trilemma of either having to give up 
an ordinary knowledge claim, to claim to know what we probably don’t 
know, or to give up closure . (Closure*), by contrast, oﬀ ers a way out. I can 
be said to know that I will never own 50 million dollars only insofar as 
it is OK for me to rely on the antecedently unknown but presupposed 
proposition that my ﬁ nancial matters will take a normal course. I cannot 
without unacceptable circularity make an inference from my premise to 
this presupposition and thus come to know it. 
 (Closure*) might even help us with skeptical puzzles when (Closure) 
doesn’t (but cf. also Brueckner  1994 , Cohen  1998 or David and Warﬁ eld 
 2008 on the question whether skepticism has much to do with closure 
  16  Some might object that (Closure*) is not a closure principle but a transmission principle (like 
(Closure), too). I don’t want to debate word choice here but just point out that any plausible 
principle of “closure” will be saying something about transmission. 
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principles). How can I, if knowledge is closed, know that I am cur-
rently seated but not know what I can infer from that, namely, for 
instance, that I am not a brain in a vat merely hallucinating that it 
is currently seated? (Closure) has a big problem here but (Closure*) 
doesn’t. I can be said to know that I am currently seated only insofar as 
it is OK for me to rely on the antecedently unknown but presupposed 
assumption that I am not being radically deceived. Again, I cannot 
make an inference from my premise to this presupposition and thus 
come to know it. 
 Nozick himself also oﬀ ers a more subtle and adequate principle of closure 
(whether or not he sees it as a principle of transmission rather than and in 
contrast to a principle of closure in the more narrow sense). It is astonishing 
how rarely this has been discussed or even mentioned (see as exceptions: a 
short paper by h ompson  1986/87 and brief passages in Kripke 2011, 194–203; 
Mazou é  1986 , 211–12; Klein  1987 , 272–73; and Roush  2005 , 63n. 29). Here it is:
 S knows via inference (from  p ) that  q if and only if 
 (1)  S knows that  p 
 (2)  q is true, and S infers  q from  p (thereby, we assume, being led to believe that 
 q ). (231) 
 h e right-to-left direction of this is remarkably close to (Closure). But 
Nozick adds two further “inference conditions”: 
 ( i )  If  q were false, S wouldn’t believe that  p (or S wouldn’t infer  q from  p ) (231) 
 plus the condition that if  q were true,  S would believe that  p (and would 
infer  q from  p if he were to infer either  q or  not-q from it) (233–4). 17 In 
other words:
 S knows (via inference from p) that  q if and only if 
 (i)  S knows that  p , 
 (ii)  competently infers  q from  p , 
 (iii)  thereby comes to believe that  q , 
 (iv)  if  q were false,  S wouldn’t believe that  p (or  S wouldn’t infer  q from  p ), and 
 (v)  if  q were true,  S would believe that  p (and would infer  q from  p if he were to 
infer either  q or  not-q from it). 
 Since closure (or transmission ) principles are usually formulated merely 
as suﬃ  cient conditions for knowledge of some inferred proposition  q , we 
can formulate Nozick’s closure (“Nozick-Closure”) in the following way: 
  17  Nozick also uses the simpliﬁ ed conditions “not- q ⇒ not-(S believes that  p )” and “ q ⇒ S believes 
that  p ” (see 234). He adds that he is less conﬁ dent about the latter than about the former (see 
692n.95). 
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 (Nozick-Closure)  Necessarily, for all subjects  S and for all propositions  p and 
 q : if  S knows that  p , competently infers  q from  p , thereby 
comes to believe that  q , and if it is also true that 
 ( i -1)  if  q were false,  S wouldn’t believe that  p (or  S wouldn’t 
infer  q from  p ), and 
 ( i -2)  if  q were true,  S would believe that  p (and would infer  q 
from  p if he were to infer either  q or  not-q from it), 
 then  S knows that  q . 18 
 Instead of the presupposition clause in (Closure*), (Nozick-Closure) 
contains the condition, roughly speaking, that the belief in the premise 
tracks the truth of the conclusion. h is is certainly not an ad hoc or arbi-
trary move, especially not for a tracking theorist. Nozick himself points 
out (see 234) that such a principle allows us to make ordinary knowledge 
claims, such as  I am seated now , at the same time deny entailed negations 
of skeptical scenarios such as  I am not a brain in a vat merely hallucinat-
ing that it is seated now , while holding on to closure : were I a brain in a 
vat merely hallucinating that I am seated I would still believe that I am 
seated. (Nozick-Closure- i -1) is not met. h is is all the more remarkable 
because Nozick thought that in order to be able to claim to know ordin-
ary propositions and to deny entailed negations of skeptical propositions 
he would have to give up closure; but his own, more developed principle 
allows for keeping closure under such circumstances. 
 We also get the desired results for the above-mentioned lottery prob-
lem as well as the problem of easy knowledge and bootstrapping : were the 
thermometer not indicating the temperature correctly or were it not reli-
able, I would still believe (within certain limits, of course) that the tem-
perature is as indicated (and not know it); and were I to win 50 million 
dollars in the future, I would still believe now that I will never be rich 
(and not know it). Like (Closure*), (Nozick-Closure) has the great advan-
tage of dealing satisfactorily with three serious problems: Harman’s lot-
tery problem , the problem of easy knowledge and bootstrapping, and the 
problem of closure-based skepticism. (Closure) fails in all these respects. 
 But how optimistic can we be about (Nozick-Closure), all things con-
sidered? Is it in the end too weak or too strong? Does its left-hand side 
oﬀ er necessary or suﬃ  cient conditions for inferential knowledge ? 
  18  I am skipping – for the sake of simplicity and because nothing hinges on it here – a further 
condition and strengthening of the antecedent which Nozick mentions later (239–40): an anti-
question-begging condition according to which it is not the case that I would not know  p would 
I not know  q . h is additional condition is somewhat similar in some respects to the ﬁ nal condi-
tion in (Closure*) but still markedly diﬀ erent. 
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 Consider the following case, which is similar to the dachshund and the 
red barn cases mentioned above. I know – as most of us would admit – 
that my friend Hans owns a dog because I know that he owns an animal 
that barks (and only dogs bark). If Hans were not to own a dog, he would 
own a wolf which does not bark (or make any other characteristic noises). 
I cannot tell such silent wolves from silent dogs. Let us assume that under 
such alternative circumstances I would still believe that Hans owns a dog 
(a silent one). According to Nozick, we have to conclude in this case – if 
we don’t do tricks with methods (see above) – that I don’t know that Hans 
owns a dog. 19 However, (Nozick-Closure) tells us that I do know that Hans 
owns a dog: if Hans would not own a dog, I would not believe that his ani-
mal barks. Nozick-Knowledge gets in the way of Nozick-Closure . And we 
should side with Nozick-Closure, considerations of plausibility suggest. 
 Here is another case (see McKinsey  1991 , 15–16). I am thinking about 
water. Suppose I know that I am thinking about water and suppose I 
also know the truth of some form of semantic externalism which entails 
that I can only have thoughts about water if I have been in contact with 
water (it doesn’t matter here whether this kind of semantic externalism is 
really true; it only matters what would and what wouldn’t follow). Can 
I then infer and come to know that I have been in contact with water, 
only on the basis of introspection and some philosophical knowledge? 
h ere is good reason to deny this or at least to be skeptical about a posi-
tive answer. However, according to (Nozick-Closure) I can come to know 
this. (Had I not been in contact with water, I would not be able to think 
thoughts about water.) (Nozick-Knowledge) agrees, perhaps vacuously, 
with that verdict for the same reasons. So, (Nozick-Closure) does not for-
mulate strong enough or suﬃ  cient conditions for inferential knowledge . 
Perhaps one can repair this by adding a further condition? It is not obvi-
ous whether one can. 
 Roush ( 2005 , 63n. 29) presents a case where the conditions on the left-
hand side of (Nozick-Closure) seem too strict for necessary conditions 
for inferential knowledge : someone can know an (inductive) generaliza-
tion from which she can infer and thus come to know that the ice cubes 
left in the sun will melt – even if she would have continued to believe 
in the generalization had the ice cubes not melted in the sun (see also 
Klein  1987 , 272–73 for a more intricate example leading to the same gen-
eral conclusion). Both (Nozick-Knowledge) and (Nozick-Closure) seem 
  19  Nozick does not comment on this type of case. If he had claimed that the subject knows that 
Hans owns a dog, all the worse for his account. 
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to give the wrong, negative verdict about knowledge here. 20 If we’re 
only interested in suﬃ  cient conditions for inferential knowledge (as we 
are when we’re interested in a closure principle), then this might not be 
such bad news for (Nozick-Closure), but it would still be a problem for 
( Nozick-Knowledge). 
 h ompson ( 1986/87 , 262–64) presents counterexamples to (Nozick-
Closure- i -2): a subject knows that he was born in San Diego and infers 
and comes to know that he was born in the USA; however, the fact that 
he could have easily been born in San Francisco and come to believe this 
does not threaten inferential knowledge that he was born in the USA. 
(Nozick-Closure) seems too strong, again, and not to indicate necessary 
conditions for inferential knowledge (see also h ompson  1986/87 , 264, for 
an attempt to repair this problem). However, one could reply that closure 
principles are typically formulated as suﬃ  cient (and not necessary) condi-
tions for inferential knowledge . Overall, (Nozick-Knowledge) gives the 
right verdict in this case. 
 Nozick accepts closure under known equivalence (see 229) but rejects 
closure under known conjunction elimination (see 228). According to 
Nozick, he can know that he is in Emerson Hall, which entails that he 
is in Emerson Hall and not a brain in a vat far away from Emerson Hall; 
relying on the equivalence of the latter with the former, Nozick can infer 
and come to know that he is in Emerson Hall and not envatted far away 
from Emerson Hall. However, he cannot come to know by conjunction 
elimination that he is not envatted far away from Emerson Hall. (Nozick-
Closure) supports this verdict, as does (Nozick-Knowledge). Hawthorne 
( 2005 , 31–32) holds that this is unacceptable, while Adams , Barker , and 
Figurelli ( 2011 ) argue that one should stick with closure under conjunc-
tion elimination but give up closure under known equivalence. What 
should one do here? I think that (Closure*) rather than (Nozick-Closure) 
makes it plausible that, and explains why, Nozick could be right at least 
in his verdict about the skeptical scenario: Nozick can be said to know 
that he is in Emerson Hall, given that it is OK for him to rely on certain 
(anti- skeptical) presuppositions, but he cannot come to know these pre-
suppositions by inference from the relevant premises. 
 Finally existential generalization. Nozick thinks he can hold on to clos-
ure under known existential generalization (see 234), but Fumerton ( 1987 ) 
and Garrett ( 1999 ) present counterexamples. Let us take Fumerton’s 
 20  If one were to argue in favor of the negative verdict, then it is very hard to see how one can hold 
on to the possibility of inductive knowledge in general. 
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example (see Fumerton  1987 , 172). Suppose that Richard knows (from 
reading the newspaper) that Jones murdered Smith. Had Jones not mur-
dered Smith, then one of the nine colleagues of Jones would have done 
it and Richard would have found out (from the newspaper) that Jones 
did not murder Smith. However, had none of the ten would-be killers 
managed to kill Smith, then the newspaper would have reported the false 
rumor that Jones murdered Smith. Under these circumstances, Richard 
would know that Jones murdered Smith but not that someone murdered 
Smith. Given Fumerton’s version of the example, this would be due to 
(Nozick-Knowledge) and would be compatible with (Nozick-Closure) 
(because its condition  i -1 would be violated in the case of the existential 
belief). However, one can easily change the story (by assuming, say, that 
the rumor would say that someone but not Jones had murdered Smith) 
in such a way that only (Nozick-Knowledge) but not (Nozick-Closure) 
 forces us to say that Jones doesn’t know that someone murdered Smith. 
However, if one were to try to defend Nozick here, one should rather 
stress the intricate nature of the example and argue that it is not so clear 
whether Richard can come to know by reading the newspaper whether 
Jones murdered Smith. Could he really, given that this newspaper would 
spread false rumors in certain cases? 21 
 i v   conclusion 
 Where does all this leave us? Nozick does not deny closure , 22 despite his 
own announcements to the contrary. Instead, he proposes a rather sophis-
ticated and useful principle of closure, (Nozick-Closure), which can deal 
surprisingly well with certain skeptical puzzles (again, against some of 
Nozick’s own statements) as well as with some other problems, like the 
problem of easy knowledge and bootstrapping or Harman’s lottery prob-
lem. More standard principles like (Closure) have serious problems here 
(but not (Closure*), which is not that diﬀ erent from Nozick’s principle). 
  21  Nozick’s scepticism about closure under known universal instantiation (see 227–28) remains as a 
problem. My true belief that all members of the club have paid their dues might track the truth 
even though my true belief that member Wilson has paid his dues might not track the truth 
because I would never believe in his tardiness. It still seems very plausible that I can come to 
know, via inference from the general proposition, that Wilson has paid his dues. Both (Nozick-
Knowledge) and (Nozick-Closure) seem to give the wrong verdict in such cases. 
 22  I am ignoring problems with multi-premise closure here. It seems that everyone has a problem 
with that and good reason to doubt that there are valid principles of multi-premise closure (see 
Hawthorne  2004 ). 
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 But there are also problems indicating that Nozick’s view of knowledge 
is in tension with his closure principle; the problem here is that we should 
often go with the latter against the former. And then there are problems 
like the (at least prima facie) failure (in Nozick’s theory) of closure under 
known existential generalization. 23 
 However, two points should be stressed, again, at the end. First, what-
ever one thinks about the above problems of Nozick’s theory, they’re – as 
(Nozick-Closure) helps to explain – not knock-down problems. (h ere 
might be other such problems elsewhere in his theory.) Second, Nozick’s 
theory does not entail the denial of closure ; on the contrary, he proposes 
a very interesting alternative closure principle which has been widely 
neglected, even by Nozick himself. 24 
  23  I think (Closure*) does very well in all those cases. 
 24  I am grateful for comments by Fred Adams, Kelly Becker, Audre Brokes, and Byeong D. Lee. 
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